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A b s t r a c t  This paper explores the profitability of real estate franchises. The 
database for the study consists of observations from the National 
Association of Realtors®' 2001 survey of real estate brokerage 
firms. Franchises are found to generate additional revenue for 
franchisees. However, net margins defined as the difference 
between revenues received and expenses paid (including 
franchise royalties) are lower for firms with franchises. The 
findings indicate that franchisors appear to extract the excess 
rents from the franchisee. 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Franchising is widespread in the real estate industry, particularly in the hotel and 
residential brokerage sectors. According to the National Association of Realtors® (see 
www.realtors.org), there are over I million Realtors® of which approximately one-third 
work for franchised residential brokerage firms. Previous research by Lewis and 
Anderson (1999) reveals that franchise-affiliated firms have lower costs than independent 
brokerage firm. Anderson. Lewis and Zumpano (2000) show that franchised firms are 
more efficient than their non-franchised counterparts, but they further report that 
franchise affiliates are not necessarily more profitable.
1
 The findings presented in this 
paper provide further insight into the relationship between franchisors and their 
affiliates.
2 
In exchange for receiving a proportion of revenue, such as the 8% charged by Cendant to 
Century 21 franchisees, the franchisor provides stipulated benefits by contract to the 
franchisee.
3
 A franchise offers a well-known brand name that signals information about 
the quality of the firm (including reliability) to new and existing clientele. Additional 
benefits can include marketing, training, accounting services, etc.
4
 Unless the franchisor 
controls specific customer traffic, such as a hotel reservation system, the services sold 
by the franchisor are general and common to all franchisees. 
This paper is organized into six sections. The following section discusses prior research on 
franchising, both in the real estate industry and in general. Following this overview, a  
model of  firm profitability is  developed, to describe the relationship between 
franchise fees and expected revenue, profit and net margin. 
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Next, the empirical model and sample data are discussed. Empirical findings and 
concluding remarks are presented in the last two sections. 
Franchising a n d  R e s i d e n t i a l  B r o k e r a g e  
Past studies support the hypothesis that franchise affiliates have higher gross 
revenues that allow them to pay positive fees to the franchisor. For example, Jud, 
Rogers and Crellin (1994) show that franchise affiliation results in a 9% increase 
in net revenue.
5
 These studies ignore whether franchises have greater profitability. 
Even though there is a difference in sales performance across franchisees, and 
within the same unit over time, the fees levied by franchisors are relatively 
constant and not performance-based (Lafontaine and Shaw, 1999). 
Another area of academic study of franchising is marketplace signaling. Signaling 
information about the quality of the franchisee is not available initially, but 
becomes observed over time (Gallini and Lutz, 1992). Franchisees that survive 
have better reputations and, therefore, should qualify for lower fees (Mathewson 
and Winter, 1985). Lafontaine and Shaw (1999) indicate that information 
differences across franchisees are small and that imposing a plethora of separate 
fees leads to management costs. They find that the royalty, or percentage fee, and 
the fixed franchise fee are not negatively correlated.6 
A  M o d e l  o f  R e s i d e n t i a l  R e a l  E s t a t e  F r a n c h i s i n g  
In the conventional industrial organization analysis, franchising is a method of 
extracting effort by reallocating incentives. The royalty is the percentage payment 
from income to the franchisor, and the franchise fee is the fixed up-front cost. Let 
R be the percentage of revenue paid as the royalty and F be the franchise fee. 
The amount of broker labor input for a non-franchised firm is BN while WN is the 
wage, or dollar split of the commission revenue paid to sales agents. With no 
franchise membership, the profit for the firm is P = Y (KN, BN) — WNBN where KN 
represents fixed inputs and Y is the firm's revenue function.  
In franchising. as with any business organization, labor input and effort are 
contingent on the form of the organization. If only an employee, a manager would 
put in less input and effort than would be the case if awarded a share of the profit. 
If the same firm is organized as a franchise, then maximizing profit of the 
franchisor subject to a profit-making condition of the franchisee yields: P' = 
(1 — R)Y' (K,B) — F — WB. Here W is the compensation for all employees except 
the brokerage firm owner (franchisee). In real estate markets, the franchise fee (F) 
is usually negligible, but R can be substantial. Real estate brokerage firms are 
frequently liquidity-constrained with limited resources to pay a fixed fee. 
There are numerous real estate brokerage firms, and most brokerage firms have 
the opportunity to join a franchise. However, a firm will only join a franchise if 
it is profitable, so marginal revenue must at least equal marginal cost. But in  
 
 
equilibrium, all brokerage firms must earn normal profits. Franchise firms may 
offer more market appeal to customers than non-franchise firms because they offer 
more name recognition (a positive signal) and perhaps reduce uncertainty for 
customers. Franchise firms have higher revenues that allow franchisees to recover 
their fixed franchise fees (F) and royalties (RY'). However, if franchisors extract 
the excess economic rent from their franchisees, the profits of both franchise and 
non-franchise firms should be the same.' Setting the profit equations equal (P = 
P'), the equilibrium level of revenues (Y*) of franchisees who recover expenses 
F and RY occurs at labor input B*, wage level W* and capital K*: 
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Data 
The sample is from a national survey of residential brokerage firms about their 
financial performance, conducted by the National Association of Realtors®. The 
survey was conducted on 9,321 firms in Spring 2001. The response rate was 2,792 
useable surveys or 30%.' If more than 50% of a respondent's business was from 
commercial brokerage, the survey was removed from the sample in order to obtain 
a sample of real estate firms that focus primarily on residential real estate. Missing 
responses to key variables and the 50% residential brokerage constraint reduced 
the sample to 1,792 useable observations. 
Exhibit 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the 1,792 observations. There is a 
distribution between franchised and non-franchised firms. Of the sample, 26% are 
franchised with the remaining 74% non-franchised. Of all firms, 98% are members 
of a referral or relocation network. The average firm makes a net margin of 18.6% 
in profit on its sales, and it has been in business for 21 years. This average business 
length creates a time to establish local information networks. The sample is 
distributed across the country: 33% in the South, 23% in the Midwest, 26% in 
the West and 18% in the East. Of the sample, 60% have only one office and 56% 
of the firms have 10 or fewer brokers or agents. 
Empi r ica l  Resu l t s  
Exhibit 2 presents empirical models of brokerage firm total revenue, net income, 
and net margin, where franchise affiliation is one of the independent variables. 
The independent variables in the models also include the number of relocation 
services subscribed to by the firm (Reloc), the age of the firm (Age), various 
proxies for the size of firm (Oneoff, Mfirm and Lfirm), the number of third-party 
websites on which the firm's listings appear (Numbwehs) and regional variables. 
Each of the three financial performance models (revenue, net income and net 
margin) is statistically significant at the 1% level or better, with model F-values 
ranging from 47.93 in the total revenue model to 16.58 in the net income model. 
The adjusted R2 varies from .25 in the total margin model to .13 in the net income 
model. 
All of the dependent variables appear in logarithmic form, and these regressions 
a re  est imated  us ing weighted  leas t  squares  to  cor rec t  for  sample 
heteroscedasticity.
9
 The weights used in this procedure are the sample weights  
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from the NAR survey, and they are designed to reflect the differential probability 
of firm and item non-response.
10 
The results in Exhibit 2 show that in the total revenue regression equation, the 
coefficient on the franchise variable (βy is positive and significant at the 1% level. 
The increase of 0.37 for the franchise variable translates to approximately an 
increase of 45%.
11
 Among other variables in the revenue equation, being a member 
of a relocation network increases sales revenue.
12
 The age variable results show 
that a firm obtains 2% more sales revenue with each year of age. The production 
function does not have negative returns in the realm of operations, since revenue 
and net income are increasing in the size of firm. The findings also indicate that 
number of third-party website upon which listings appear is found to be 
significantly and positively related to sales revenue: the interaction of this variable 
with relocation service, however, is negative but not statistically significant. In 
addition, sales revenues of firms are not related to region of the country.  
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The net margin regression results are shown in the last column of Exhibit 2. The 
franchise coefficient has the expected βm < 0, indicating lower profit margins for 
franchisees. The net margin coefficient in Exhibit 2 is —0.22; a firm with a 
franchise has a margin that is 19.7% lower than a firm that does not have a 
franchise. At the sample mean margin of 18.6% of gross revenue, a firm with a 
franchise has a margin of about four percentage points lower, or 14.9%. The 
findings indicate that relocation services have a very strong positive effect on the 
net margin and, when evaluated in the context of firm revenue and net income, 
suggest that the cost of providing such services is low. The number of third-party 
websites upon which listings appear is strongly and positively related to net 
income. However, for firms with such third-party website listings, the benefit of 
relocation services declines substantially, as indicated by the large negative 
interaction coefficient. This finding supports the contention that firms that are part 
of a relocation network can increase their revenue, but that web impact reduces 
the benefit of a relocation service." Contrary to the positive age coefficient with 
respect to revenues, the age coefficient shows that a firm obtains 1% lower profit 
 
 
margin with each year of age. Larger firms do have smaller margins; medium and 
large firms have coefficient values of —0.89 and —0.80, respectively. There are 
some additional regional effects, with margins being lower in the South and 
Midwest. 
Finally, from the second column of Exhibit 2, the coefficient on the franchise 
variable in the net income equation is zero. This coefficient in the information 
differential model should be non-positive assuming that the franchisor absorbs 
excess rents. If the net income coefficient were statistically positive, the franchise 
fee plus royalty would be under-priced. The relocation service coefficient is 
positive and highly significant; this is consistent with the view that the cost of 
offering such services is relatively low. Although the magnitudes of the other 
coefficients differ from the sales revenue regression, the coefficient signs of the 
coefficients are the same for the significant variables including age, size number 
of third-party website listings and the interaction variable for third-party website 
listings and relocation service. 
The use of technology, as measured by the number of third-party websites for 
firm listings, and the use of a relocation service are statistically significant and 
positive at the .01 level or better in each of the three financial performance 
equations. However, the negative interaction variable indicates that the benefits 
are somewhat less for firms that effectively use a relocation network.  
Conclus ion  
This study examines the effect of franchising on the profitability of residential 
real estate brokerage firms. The findings indicate that franchisees have higher 
revenue consistent with potential benefits of a franchise. Such benefits can include 
enhanced name recognition, reduction in customer uncertainty, and assistance in 
marketing and training. However, net profits are not statistically significantly 
different between non-franchise firms and franchisees. This finding is consistent 
with the expectation that franchisors absorb the excess rents. Moreover, the net 
profit margin for franchisees is less than that of non-franchise firms. 
An important implication for the potential franchisee is to consider the cost- 
benefits of a franchise. Although the global net profit advantage for a franchise 
does not appear to exist, individual firms might find a franchise particularly 
valuable depending on the current local competition, the level of knowledge and 
expertise of the owners, and the characteristics of the customer base in a particular 
locality. 
Endnotes 
1. Historically academic studies focus on economies of scale or scope in real estate 
brokerage. Zumpano, Elder and Crellin (1993) show small economies of scale except  
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with very large residential brokerage firms. Zumpano and Elder (1994) show that a 
balanced mix of listings and sales leads to economies of scope and minimize costs. 
Anderson, Fok, Zumpano and Elder (1998) find that the average brokerage firm operates 
close to its efficient frontier. 
2. Other types of real estate relationships where there is a sharing of revenue, such as with 
property and asset management contracts are similar lo the franchisor-franchisee 
relationships studied here. 
3. The Cendant fee is the sum of 6% of gross revenues for a royalty and 2% for national 
marketing. 
4. Many residential brokerage firms use customer generating tools such as technology, 
extensive print media and traditional direct marketing such as mailings to gain clients. 
Franchised firms tend to have a greater use of technology and relocation networks, as in 
Sirmans and Macpherson (2001). 
5. Jud. Rogers and Crellin (1994) estimate that franchise affiliation yields this average 9% 
increase in net revenues after subtracting the royalties, fees and other charges associated 
with franchise affiliation. Other researchers provide further support for positive benefits 
associated with franchise affiliation. Frew and Jud (1986) find that franchise affiliation 
has a positive effect on brokerage firm sales and house prices, while Colwell and 
Marshall (1986) find that the presence of a franchise, the size of the sales force and the 
quantity of display advertising positively affect market share of listings and sales for 
brokerage firms. Richins. Black and Sirmans (1987) also show that franchise affiliation 
has a positive effect on market performance. 
6. If both parties are risk-averse, then franchising creates a sharing of the risk (Martin, 
1988). In real estate, the sharing is on revenue rather than net operating income, leading 
to incentives by the franchisor lo increase expenses and reduce profits of the franchisee. 
7. Special thanks to the anonymous reviewer who facilitated the development of the 
mathematical model by providing a logical set of arguments and conditions. 
8. To compensate for lower response rates to surveys. NAR sent extra surveys to larger- 
sized firms (>200 licensees) and medium-sized firms (1I-200 licenses), in order to 
ensure a representative response by firms. Further, responses were weighted by firm 
size. 
9. The weighted least squares estimator is: bWLS = (X'W'WX)-1X'W'Wy according to 
Greene (1996). In our study, let W be a diagonal matrix containing the sample weights w 
along the diagonal and zeros elsewhere, and let y and X be the usual matrices associated 
with the left- and right-hand side variables. 
10. 10 NAR now recognized that their surveys have a built-in response bias because larger 
brokerages respond at a lower rate than smaller firms. This bias is lessened in the 2001 
survey by over sampling of larger firms (including both groups of 11 to 200 agents and 
firms with more than 200 agents). A weigh was developed to control for possible over 
sampling and differing response rates. 
11. The increase is estimated as %ΔY* = e0.37 — 1 because the dummy variable, Fran, is 
converted from the logarithmic specification by this transformation. 
12. 12 Higher gross revenues also allow the franchisee owners or principals to benefit from 
their increased individual commission revenues, but we are unable to calculate (given 
our data limitations) this added benefit. 
13. As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, one explanation for these findings is that 
homebuyers who use relocation services have limited knowledge of a local area, do not 
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invest as much time in the home search process, and are more reliant on the particular 
brokerage firm with relocation services. This places such firms at an advantage relative 
to other residential brokerage firms for this type of customer. Therefore, customers could 
be steered to properties offering higher revenue and profits to the brokerage firm. The 
presence of properties listed on the web increases information availability to the buyer, 
and, thereby, may decrease profits and revenues for a relocation service. 
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